Israel on Alert: Chinese Tech’s Covert Data Collection Threat

• Israel grapples with growing concerns over Chinese smart devices, from cars to cameras, potentially sending sensitive user data to Beijing.
• This intensifies warnings about China’s powerful intelligence capabilities.

Israel’s Wake-Up Call: Banning Chinese Tech

Israeli defense officials are now taking a firmer stance against Chinese-manufactured smart devices, following mounting pressure from cybersecurity experts. The Defense Ministry recently halted a tender for Chinese cars intended for IDF lieutenant colonels, a significant shift given previous procurements of Chinese electric vehicles like the MGZS and Chery Tiggo 8 models for military use. Notably, these newer vehicles were banned from high-security IDF bases, prompting the complete disconnection of their e-Call emergency systems to sever external communication.

However, Dr. Harel Menashri, a co-founder of the Shin Bet’s cyber division and a leading expert, argues these measures are insufficient. He emphasizes that Chinese cars, equipped with advanced sensors and communication capabilities, function as sophisticated intelligence-gathering systems. These vehicles can reportedly collect extensive visual, audio, and even biometric data about occupants and surroundings, transmitting this raw intelligence directly to servers in China. This concern echoes sentiments from the Biden administration, which last year blocked the sale of Chinese cars in the U.S., citing national security risks. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo famously likened these connected cars to “smartphones on wheels,” highlighting their potential for remote control or disabling.

Beyond vehicles, Menashri points to the pervasive use of Chinese-made security cameras, such as those from Hikvision and Dahua, which were banned by the U.S. government for defense use in 2018 and fully in 2021 due to their immediate data transmission to Chinese government servers upon network connection. Despite these international warnings, these cameras are widely deployed across Israel, including by government organizations, municipalities, and even the police and IDF. Furthermore, investigations by U.S. departments of Commerce, Defense, and Justice suspect that TP-Link Wi-Fi routers, which hold a 65% market share in the U.S., may act as “conduits” for cyber breaches and espionage, a concern particularly relevant given their presence in sensitive U.S. federal agencies and an unknown share in the Israeli market.

Beyond the Obvious: Everyday Devices as Spies

The threat extends beyond government and military hardware into everyday consumer technology. Robotic vacuum cleaners, now equipped with Wi-Fi chips, lasers, cameras, and sensors, gather extensive data about home layouts, routines, and potentially even occupants’ income levels. In 2020, security firm Checkmarx identified vulnerabilities in a Chinese-made smart robotic vacuum cleaner that allowed external attackers full access to photographed materials. Drones, predominantly manufactured by Chinese giant DJI (holding an 80% share of the American private market), also pose significant concerns. Despite a U.S. Department of Defense ban on Chinese-made drones, the U.S. Department of Commerce is considering broader restrictions due to acute national security and privacy risks.

The notorious social media platform TikTok is often seen as just the “tip of the iceberg” in this pervasive data collection. Although its U.S. operations were initially challenged by the Biden administration, and later “resumed” by Trump, the U.S. Department of Justice alleges TikTok collects user data, censors content inconvenient to Beijing, and serves as a “conduit for the content moderation decisions made by its Chinese affiliates.” All TikTok data is reportedly transferred to servers in or controlled by China, raising fears it could be used to undermine Western interests and influence public opinion, thus posing a security threat. This concern is underscored by a joint statement from U.S., Canadian, British, Australian, and New Zealand intelligence services, which exposed the Flax Typhoon network – a system of 260,000 cameras, routers, and other internet-connected devices used by a Chinese army-affiliated hacking group to spy on sensitive organizations in five countries.

Even major tech players aren’t immune. A sophisticated infiltration into Microsoft’s cloud platform recently provided China access to emails of senior American diplomats. The “cranes affair,” where the U.S. invested billions to replace Chinese-manufactured ZPMC cranes in ports due to concerns over their communication equipment exceeding operational needs, further illustrates the breadth of potential espionage. Similarly, the long-standing battle against Huawei, once the world’s largest supplier of cellular networks, highlights concerns about embedded “back doors” in network infrastructure that could collect, analyze, and process information, potentially even disrupting military communications.

The Broader Picture: China’s “Whole-of-State” Espionage

FBI Director Christopher Wray has consistently warned that China aims to “ransack” Western companies’ intellectual property to dominate key industries, “snooping” on companies of all sizes across various sectors, from aviation to AI to pharmaceuticals. He describes China’s efforts as a “whole-of-state effort to become the world’s only superpower by any means necessary,” employing sophisticated techniques ranging from cyber intrusions to corrupting trusted insiders and outright physical theft. This expansive approach involves not just Chinese intelligence services but also state-owned enterprises, ostensibly private companies, and even certain graduate students and researchers.

China’s 2016 Counter-Terrorism Law mandates that telecommunications and internet service providers must provide technical interfaces and decryption support to public security and state security organs. This effectively means manufacturers must grant government personnel access to their production lines and source codes, enabling the implantation of “back doors” for remote hacking and information gathering. This strategy leverages China’s ability to produce quality products cheaply, facilitating widespread dissemination while simultaneously making them easier to exploit for intelligence purposes. The Ministry of State Security (MSS), China’s principal espionage agency, is rapidly expanding, aligned with Xi Jinping’s vision of China becoming the world’s leading military and economic superpower, as outlined in the “Made in China 2025” roadmap.

The FBI states that cases involving the theft of American technology constitute approximately one-third of its counterintelligence investigations, calling China the “greatest long-term threat to our nation’s information and intellectual property, and to our economic vitality.” The U.S. estimates $600 billion in stolen intellectual property annually, while the EU estimates €50 billion in damage and a loss of 670,000 jobs per year. The FBI is reportedly opening a new China-related counterintelligence case every 10 hours. China’s interest spans a wide range of areas, exemplified by the case of former General Electric employee Xiaoqing Zheng, who was sentenced for stealing confidential information related to gas and steam turbines. This systematic theft aims to reduce reliance on foreign technology and ultimately achieve dominance in critical sectors.

The “Thousand Talents Plan” and Global Reach

Beyond direct cyber operations, China employs programs like the “Thousand Talents Plan” (TTP), ostensibly designed to attract leading scientists and researchers. However, Western security experts argue this program encourages the theft of commercial and intellectual property secrets under quasi-legal pretenses. Participants often sign contracts with government-affiliated Chinese entities, obligating them to share new technological developments exclusively with China and recruit further talent. Many participants come from leading Western laboratories, companies, and universities, including those involved in sensitive government research.

Information security experts in Israel, identified as “N.” and “T.”, emphasize that “the Chinese gather information about everything. Everything is of interest to them.” Dr. Menashri adds, “I’ve never come across Chinese technology that doesn’t transmit.” He explains that Chinese-made devices immediately search for internet communication channels to transmit data to government servers in China upon operation. While seemingly innocuous, even data from a robotic vacuum cleaner contributes to vast databases of metadata, which China, a leader in AI, can “melt down” into valuable intelligence to understand foreign ways of life.

The strategic infiltration extends to global infrastructure, mirroring China’s approach to natural resources in countries like those in Africa. China offers to build civil infrastructure, roads, bridges, and communication networks in exchange for resources, often providing loans that recipient countries cannot repay, eventually leading to the transfer of infrastructure ownership to the Chinese government. Sri Lanka’s government, for instance, reportedly collapsed after state infrastructure was transferred to China.

For Israel, the risk of information leaks to China is considered even more serious than threats from countries like Iran, due to China’s advanced capabilities and swift exploitation of program “weaknesses” for new hackings. Chinese hackers are now exploiting vulnerabilities within days or weeks, indicating highly advanced processing and computing capabilities. They also use Israeli IP device addresses to infiltrate organizations, making it difficult to trace the source of attacks. For a decade, senior Israeli defense officials have warned about the inherent risk of Chinese Communist Party ownership of critical infrastructure in Israel, fearing potential incapacitation or harm, alongside its use for intelligence gathering. While China has extensive interests in the Arab world and Iran, operating almost all infrastructure in Iran and consistently voting against Israel in international forums, it simultaneously maintains extensive trade relations and invests heavily in strategic assets and critical infrastructure within Israel.